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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents an efficient group key management protocol, CKCS (Code for Key Calculation in 
Simultaneous join/leave) for simultaneous join/leave in secure multicast. This protocol is based on logical 
key hierarchy. In this protocol, when new members join the group simultaneously, server sends only the 
group key for those new members. Then, current members and new members calculate the necessary keys 
by node codes and one-way hash function. A node code is a random number which is assigned to each 
key to help users calculate the necessary keys. Again, at leave, the server just sends the new group key to 
remaining members. The results show that CKCS reduces computational and communication overhead, 
and also message size in simultaneous join/leave. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
IP multicast (hereinafter multicast) is an efficient group communication protocol to deliver 
multicast content from a single source to multiple users. This communication technology uses 
IGMP (Internet Group Management Protocol) [1] for group membership that allows members to 
join the group and receive content freely. As a result, open group membership by IGMP leads to 
eavesdropping. In order to avoid this threat, group key management has been proposed. Group 
key is a key that is shared by all group members and the sender for encrypting data by the 
sender and decrypting transmitted data by the group members. 
The security requirements of secure multicast are forward secrecy and backward secrecy [2]. 
Forward secrecy ensures when a member leaves the group, he/she cannot access successfully 
the current content. Backward secrecy ensures that a new member cannot access any data which 
is sent before its join process. Because of these requirements, group key needs to be updated on 
each membership change and to be distributed to the valid group members securely. This 
process is called group re-keying or re-keying in short. 
Two types of group membership, single and simultaneous exist in multicast. Figure 1 illustrates 
the process of join/leave in which only one member, un+1 joins/leaves the multicast group. In 
single join/leave, the server is considered to reply only one user’s join/leave request. However 
in real world, simultaneous join/leave occurs more 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.4, No.4, July 2012 
262 
 
 
 
multiple requests from different users to the server at the same time. Figure 2 shows the 
simultaneous join/leave operations which occur concurrently in a multicast group. In 
simultaneous join/leave, the server needs to response multiple requests synchronously. As 
providing forward/backward secrecy is important in single join/leave, these requirements are 
crucial in simultaneous case as well. 
Re-keying implies large overhead on each membership change for dynamic groups. Usually, the 
overhead at leave is larger than the overhead at join. Because when a new member joins the 
group, the new group key can be encrypted by the previous one and distributed by multicast to 
the existing members except the new member who receives the group key by unicast being 
encrypted by his/her individual key. But when a member leaves the group, the group key is 
encrypted by each member’s individual key and is transmitted by unicast to the remaining 
members individually. In this case, the previous group key is supposed compromised. So, for a 
group with n members, the re-keying overhead is O(n). 
Many protocols have been proposed for group key management [3]-[10]. The main purpose of 
them is how to distribute group key to valid members efficiently at leave. The proposed 
protocols are based on logical hierarchy model. The common issue with all of these protocols is 
that they focus only on single join/leave. Although these protocols reduce the re-keying 
overhead largely at leave from O(n) to O(log n), they increase re-keying overhead from O(1) to 
O(log n) at join [3]-[8]. While proposals in [9],[10] reduce re-keying overhead at join for 
multicast communication compared with [3]-[8], none of them [3]-[10] focus on reducing re-
keying overhead for a new member at join. 
In fact, reducing re-keying overhead for new members at join is an important factor for 
simultaneous mode. Because, when m members join the group simultaneously, the server should 
deliver the necessary keys to both the new and the current members. For the current members, 
the overhead has already been decreased, but for new member the overhead still remains. So, in 
simultaneous mode, reducing overhead of key delivery to new members at join is a critical 
factor. Therefore, it is necessary to have the minimum overhead for the new members at join. 
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Figure 1.  Single join/leave 
 
Figure 2.  Simultaneous join/leave 
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For this purpose, the overhead of re-keying for new member in single join/leave should be 
minimized at first. Then, by improving that method, the proposed protocol can be used in 
simultaneous mode. 
As stated before, most of the previous approaches do not consider simultaneous join/leave. [11] 
is the only research that addresses simultaneous join/leave by periodic re-keying. However, this 
proposal does not support forward and backward secrecies. This is the main problem with this 
protocol because some members may repeat join/leave within a period. Moreover, this approach 
does not propose any specific method for re-keying.  
This paper develops the mechanism of key tree management in [12] and adopts the protocol to 
simultaneous join/leave. CKCS is a hierarchical protocol which has the minimum re-keying 
overhead at join/leave compared to [3]-[10]. In CKCS, all necessary keys are calculated by 
members using code for key calculation rather than distributed by the key server. As a result, 
key generation, key encryption and message size overhead are reduced to O(m) where m 
denotes the number of members who join the group simultaneously. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the overview of the secure multicast 
network, and discusses the researches which are based on the hierarchical approach. The design 
principles and detailed design of our proposal are shown in sections 3 and 4, respectively.  At 
the end of section 5, we discuss the security of our protocol. In section 6, we compare our 
protocol with the hierarchical based researches.  Section 7 is the conclusion. 
2. RELATED WORK 
2.1. Network Structure 
Figure 3 illustrates the network structure of secure multicast. This network has three major 
parts; key server, multicast sender and multicast members. Key server is responsible for 
generating the keys and delivering them to both multicast sender and the existing members. 
Multicast sender encrypts the contents by the key which is received from the key server and 
distributes the encrypted content to all the group members. Multicast members are the 
authorized users who receive group content from multicast sender and also the necessary keys 
from the key server.  
When a new member joins a multicast group, he/she should send IGMP request to his/her 
nearest router to receive multicast data from the network. Also, the new member needs to send a 
join request to the key server. When the new member’s request is accepted by the key server, re-
keying process should be started. All the updated keys must be delivered by the key server to 
multicast sender, the new member and all the existing members. When a member leaves a 
multicast group, he/she needs to send IGMP leave message to stop content delivery at first. 
Then, this member should inform the key server by sending a leave message. In next subsection, 
re-keying process of some previously proposed protocols is reviewed. 
2.2. Existing LKH Approaches 
Wallner et al. in [3] proposed LKH (Logical Key Hierarchy) approach for group key 
management in secure multicast. Later, several versions of LKH based protocols were proposed 
[4]-[10]. In these protocols, a centralized server is responsible for managing the group and 
distributing the group key to all group members. In LKH based protocols, the members of 
multicast group are mapped to the leaves of a logical key tree. This tree is a d-ary tree, typically 
a binary one. Each member stores all the keys from the leaf node along the path to the root. The 
root key is the group key. When a member joins or leaves the group, all the keys in his/her 
possession need to be changed to new ones. The lowest level in the tree can be the starting 
point in a way that a new parent key is encrypted by using its two child keys and distributed to 
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users. Since the height of the key tree is log n, as a resultthe complexity of re-keying is also 
O(log n).  
 
Figure 4 shows the outline of re-keying procedure for LKH at join. This figure depicts the 
logical key tree with seven existing members, u1 through u7, when u8 joins the group. At this 
time, the affected middle node keys, K7,8and K5,8, and the group key, KG, are changed to K’7,8, 
K’5,8, and K’G respectively, because these nodes are on the path from u8 to the root. Then, the 
key server sends the new keys to the related members. First, all the keys which u8 needs to have, 
K’7,8 , K’5,8and K’G are sent by unicast to u8 being encrypted with K8, K’7,8and K’5,8, respectively. 
Next, K’7,8is sent to u7 being encrypted by K7. For the existing members, the updated keys are 
sent by multicast. In this example, K’5,8is sent to {u5,u6}, and u7 being encrypted with K5,6 and 
K’7,8respectively. K’G is sent for {u1,u2, u3, u4} and for {u5, u6, u7} being encrypted with K1,4 and 
K’5,8, respectively.  
 
For leave operation, the same procedure is performed. When a member leaves the group, for 
example u8, the node key of the leaving member should be deleted from the key tree at first. 
Next, all the affected middle nodes in the path to the root are updated to new ones and are sent 
to remaining members. By this method, LKH reduces re-keying overhead at leave from O(n) to 
O(log n). 
OFT [4] is another LKH based approach. The main idea of this approach is to reduce the key 
distribution overhead of the server by shifting a part of key calculation to users’ side. The key of 
 
Figure 4.  An example of logical key tree for LKH and OFT at join/leave 
 
 
Figure 3.  Network structure of secure multicast [9] 
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node (i), Ki,is calculated by using the formula Ki= f(g (Kleft (i)),g (Kright (i))). In this formula, f(x) is 
a mixing function and g(x) is a one-way hash function. The value of g(x) is called blinded key.  
Kleft (i)denotes the key of left child while Kright (i)denotes the key of right childe of the node. 
In OFT, when a member joins a multicast group, he/she receives some information includes the 
group key, his/her sibling’s blinded key, and ancestors’ sibling blinded keys. For example, in 
Figure 4 when u8 joins the group, he/she should receive the sibling blinded key, g(K7), and his 
ancestors’ siblings blinded keys which are g(K5,6) and g(K1,4). These keys are encrypted by K8. 
On the other hand, u8 calculates K’7,8, K’5,8and K’G by using the following formulas. 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
7,8 7 8
5,8 5,6 7,8
1,4 5,8
, ,
, ,
, .G
K f g K g K
K f g K g K
K f g K g K
′ =
′ =
′ ′=
 (1) 
After u8joins the group, the blinded keys of K’7,8, K’5,8and K’G are encrypted with their sibling 
keys and advertised by multicast to the existing group members as follows: 
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
1,4
5,6
7
1 4
5,8
5 6
7,8
7
8
:
:
:
multicast
K
K
K
u u g K
s u u g K
u g K
 ′
−


′
→ −



 (2) 
Now, by receiving these blinded keys, all the group members can update the necessary keys 
through the above formula. In this method, when a member leaves the group, the key updating 
process will be done as well as join operation. Therefore, OFT reduces the overhead of re-
keying from O(log n) to O(1/2 log n).   
In [9], authors divide the group members into some subgroups and assign a subgroup key to 
each subgroup. In this protocol, the key server assigns a secret to each joining member, and the 
group key is generated using those secrets. Moreover, each member is given the inverse value of 
secrets of all the other members except its own. Those inverse values help the remaining 
members to update the group key at leave. When a member leaves the group, the key server 
only informs the remaining members that the member has left the group. The new key is 
generated by individual members using the inverse value of the leaving member. In order to 
reduce the burden of maintaining the inverse values, this protocol divides the current members 
into subgroups. By this mechanism, the protocol can reduce the computational and 
communicational overhead at member leave and the maintenance overhead of inverse values at 
individual members. Although this protocol focuses on reducing the re-keying overhead at leave 
but it also reduces re-keying overhead at join. Consequently, this protocol reduces re-keying 
overhead at leave from O(log n) in LKH to O(log [n/m]) at leave when m is the number of 
subgroups. 
OKD [10] is defined based on one-way key derivation. In this method, users compute some of 
the updated keys in each group membership change instead of receiving all new keys from the 
server. A derivation function, f (x) is used to generate new keys from the old ones. OKD 
considers 3-ary tree for key tree. In OKD, when a new member joins the group, he/she is 
assigned to a suitable branch of the key tree and all the necessary keys are sent by unicast to the 
new member but the current group members calculate their necessary keys by themselves. 
While OKD reduces re-keying overhead at join for multicast communication compared with 
other LKH based protocols [2]-[7], it does not focus on reducing re-keying overhead for a new 
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member at join. So, OKD is not suitable when several members join a group simultaneously. 
The details of OKD exist in [10]. 
As shown above, LKH based methods are acceptable because they reduce re-keying overhead 
largely. If the group size is small, for example less than hundred members, one might not use a 
hierarchical approach. However, when the group size grows to several thousands or millions, 
hierarchical approaches such as LKH based protocols are needed. More important, when 
simultaneous join is considered for a system, the overhead of re-keying for the new members is 
crucial because the server has to generate the new keys and encrypt them for each new member 
individually to send them. While protocols in [9],[10] reduce re-keying overhead at join for 
multicast communication compared to the other LKH based ones [3]-[8], they do not focus on 
reducing re-keying overhead for the new members which is necessary for simultaneous join. 
Therefore, the overhead of re-keying for new members in simultaneous mode is a crucial factor. 
To handle this issue, we develop the mechanism of the key tree for simultaneous join/leave in 
our previously proposed protocol [12] and now we evaluate its performance in simultaneous 
mode. 
3. DESIGN PRINCIPLE 
We now present our new efficient protocol for group key management in simultaneous mode. In 
fact, this work (CKCS: Code for Key Calculation in Simultaneous), is an extension of our 
original idea [12]. We add some features and adopt them to simultaneous mode. The following 
design principles have been performed in our protocol. 
(1) Figure 3 illustrates the network structure of secure multicast. Using the same network 
structure for CKCS, the key server is responsible for generating and distributing only the 
group key to new members at join. First of all, new users send an IGMP message to the 
nearest router for receiving the multicast content from a multicast sender. Next, new users 
need to send a join request to the key server for receiving the session group key for 
decrypting the encrypted content. Finally, when members leave the group, they send the 
leave requests to the key server. The key server updates the group key and redistributes it to 
the remaining members and multicast sender by multicast. 
(2) Figure 5 illustrates the logical key tree in CKCS. The tree applies the concept of key tree in 
LKH approaches. When m members join a group simultaneously, the server creates a key 
tree for those users, and combines it with the current key tree by adding a new node to top 
of these two trees. Here, this top node is considered as the group key. By this technique, the 
height of the key tree remains unchanged and as a result we have a balanced tree. 
(3) Similar to LKH based approaches, in CKCS, some keys need to be updated after each 
membership change. The updated keys are calculated by the group members rather than 
distributed by the key server. For this purpose, each node of the key tree is assigned to a 
specific code called node code. A node code is a random number which is assigned to each 
middle node key to help the users calculate the necessary keys. This code is delivered to the 
new member at join as a position of that member in the key tree. It is calculated by 
concatenating a random number to right digit of its parent node code. Generally, each parent 
node code can be obtained by deleting the rightmost digit from his/her child code. By this 
mechanism, each member knows the codes of all nodes in his/her path to the root. So, 
members can update the affected node keys using these codes and the hash function after 
each membership change (Figure 6). 
(4) In this step, we explain simultaneous join in CKCS. When several users join a group 
concurrently, the server creates a new key tree for new users by assigning a position code to 
the top node of the new key tree. The previous key tree and the new one are concatenated to 
each other by adding a top node which is considered as a new group key. The key server 
encrypts the new group key with each new user's individual key and sends them by one 
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multicast message. Each new member generates the middle node keys in his/her path to the 
root by applying hash function on bitwise XOR of the group key with each node code. 
Current members only need to compute the top node of new key tree which is calculated by 
applying hash function on the previous group key. 
(5) This step describes simultaneous leave in CKCS. Depending on the position of leaving 
members, two cases are considered; the worst case and the best case (Figure 7). The worst 
case occurs when members leave the group from different leaves of the key tree while the 
best case happens when members who are located in one half of the key tree. At leave, the 
sibling node of each leaving member is moved to his/her parent position in the key tree. To 
provide forward secrecy, the server is responsible for updating the group key and sending it 
to the remaining members. The server encrypts the new group key with top node of each 
part and sends it by multicast to all remaining group members. The re-keying overhead at 
leave has the lowest value by considering the best case. 
leaving members
remaining members
(a) (b)
 
Figure 7.  Leave operation in simultaneous mode (a) worst case (b) best case 
 
 
Figure 5.  The logical key tree in CKCS 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 6.  Node code management (a) node code generation (b) simple example 
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4. DETAILED DESIGN 
In this section, we present CKCS in details. CKCS focuses on user side key calculation rather 
than server side key distribution. In this protocol, a code is assigned to each middle node of the 
key tree to help users calculate the necessary middle node keys. 
4.1. Key Tree Structure and Node Code Management in CKCS 
The key server manages the group members and sends them only the group key. When new 
members join the group, they need to know their individual keys and their positions in the key 
tree according to the basic information. After receiving join requests, the key server sends the 
new members their individual keys, and also their position codes in the key tree. The individual 
keys of the new members and their position codes are sent via a secure channel. Each node of 
the key tree has a unique code. New members can calculate the necessary middle node keys in 
their path to the root by using node codes. Each middle node key is updated by applying hash 
function on bitwise XOR of the group key and the corresponding node code as below. 
_
( _ )Gmiddle nodeK f K node code= ⊕  (3) 
Moreover, the group key is updated after each membership change. New members receive the 
group key from the key server encrypted by their individual keys. The current members can 
calculate it by applying one-way hash function on the previous group key as below. 
( )G GK f K′ =  (4) 
In simultaneous join, when multiple users join the multicast group, the server creates the key 
tree of new users at first and allocates each new user to one leaf of the key tree. The key tree of 
old group members and new simultaneous users are combined with each other by adding a new 
node to the top. At this time, the top node is assumed as the new group key. The code of the 
new top node (root node) is calculated by deleting a digit from the rightmost digit of the 
previous root code. Then, the codes of middle nodes for simultaneous join are created by 
concatenating a random number to the rightmost digit of the parent code as below. 
Childnode_code = (Parentnode_code || Random digit(s)). (5) 
Figure 8 shows the node code management procedure in simultaneous mode. Here, by joining 
the new users,{u5, u6, u7, u8}, simultaneously, new node key, K1,8, is created on top of the 
previous root node key, K1,4. The key tree of new members, {u5, u6, u7, u8}, is located to the right 
child position of the new root node. Here, the code of new root is 27 calculated by deleting 8 
from the right side of 278. The middle node codes of doted branches (key tree of new members) 
are created by attaching a random number to the right side of their parents’ code. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Node code management key tree in simultaneous case 
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4.2. Join Operation 
We use Figure 9 to explain how re-keying is done in simultaneous join by a simple example of a 
multicast group with 4current members {u1, u2, u3, u4} while {u5, u6, u7} join the group 
simultaneously. The procedure is done as follows: 
(1) {u5, u6, u7} send join requests to the key server concurrently. The server creates their key 
tree and generates their individual keys. Individual keys of the new members, {K5, K6, K7}, 
are sent through a secure channel to them. The key tree of new members is attached to the 
current key tree by adding a top node, K1,7, to the top ofK1,4. This new top node, K1,7, is the 
new group key. 
(2) There server calculates code of K1,7and all the new middle nodes in the new key tree. 27 is 
assigned to K1,7by deleting 8 from the rightmost digit of 278 assigned to K1,4. In the new 
members’ key tree, code of each middle node is generated by attaching a random number to 
the rightmost digit of his/her parent node code. These codes are 273, 2734 assigned to K5,7 
and K5,6, respectively. After generating these nodes codes, the server sends the position 
codes to them through a secure channel. 
(3) The key server updates the group key from KG to K’G, using one-way hash function. 
1,4( )GK f K′ =  (6) 
 
(4) Then, K’G is encrypted by each new member’s individual key and sent by one multicast 
message.  
5 6 7
5 6 7{ , , }: ( ) , ( ) ,( ) .multicast G K G K G Ks u u u K K K′ ′ ′→  (7) 
(5) The current group members, {u1, u2, u3, u4}, who are located in current key tree, calculate 
the new group key, K’G, by applying one-way hash function to the previous group key KG. 
1 2 3 4
1,4, , , : ( )Gu u u u K f K′ =  (8) 
(6) The new members, {u5, u6, u7}, compute all their necessary middle node keys in their path to 
the root by the following formula: 
5 6
5,6
5 6 7
5,7
, : ( ),
, , : ( ).
G
G
u u K f K 2734
u u u K f K 273
′= ⊕
′= ⊕
 (9) 
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Figure 9.  Updating key tree in simultaneous join in CKCS 
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4.3. Leave Operation 
In CKCS, when several members leave the group, the key tree is divided into two equal parts. 
As Figure 10 shows, the deleted nodes belong to one half of the key tree. So, these parts will be 
divided again and again until just the leaving members’ branches are remained. The number of 
tree divisions is equal to (log n -1) where n is the number of group members.  The key server 
encrypts the new group key by the keys of the top node of each half. We now use Figure 10 to 
explain how re-keying is done in simultaneous leave by a simple example of a multicast group 
with 8 members {u1, ... , u8} when {u1, u4, u8}leave the group. The procedure is done as follows: 
(1) When {u1, u4, u8} leave the group, the nodes of K1,2, K3,4, and K7,8 are deleted from the key 
tree and u2, u3and u7 are promoted to their top node positions. 
(2) The key server generates a random group key, K’G.  
(3) K’G is sent to the remaining group members by multicast, being encrypted by the top node 
key of each part, K2, K3, K5, 6, K7. The group key is sent to the members who are located in 
each part, part-1, part-2, part-3, and part-4 respectively. 
 
(4) Now, {u2, u3, u5, u6, u7} whose their middle nodes are affected from this simultaneous  
leave, update K1,4and K5,7to K’1,4and K’5,7respectively by applying one-way hash function on 
bitwise XOR of the group key and the related node codes. 
2 3
1,4
5 6 7
5,7
, : ( ),
, , : ( ).
G
G
u u K f K 278
u u u K f K 273
′ ′= ⊕
′ ′= ⊕
 (11) 
 
 
Figure 10. Simultaneous leave for CKCS 
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(10) 
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5. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we analyze the security requirements of CKCS. Backward secrecy ensures that 
new members at join cannot achieve the archived contents in the group. In CKCS, the new 
group key is organized by applying one-way hash function to the previous group key. One-way 
hash function has the property of one-wayness which means that it is easy to calculate y = E(x), 
but by given y it is computationally hard to find x. Therefore, it is impossible for a new member 
to find the previous group key. 
Forward secrecy ensures that when several members leave the group, they cannot access 
successfully the current contents. In CKCS, the new members cannot generate the current 
session keys with their previous information because the group key is generated by the key 
server at leave, and is transmitted by the node keys that the leaving members do not have them. 
6. COMPARISON 
In this section, we compare CKCS protocol with some previously proposed ones, LKH, OFT, 
and OKD. We compare these protocols at join and leave operations for simultaneous mode. The 
comparison measures are based on key generation, key encryption, communication overhead, 
and message size. Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 summarize our comparisons, focusing on the following 
measures: 
 Computational overhead 
o Key generation overhead: the number of keys that must be generated at join/leave. 
o Encryption overhead: the number of encryptions. 
 Communication overhead: the number of transmissions from the key server. 
 Message size: the total number of keys in one message. 
The computational overhead is the sum of key generation and key encryption. In our 
comparisons shown in the following tables, n denotes the group size which is the number of 
members in the multicast group after join and before leave operations. In addition, in 
simultaneous mode, m denotes the number of members that join or leave multicast group 
concurrently. Finally, in simultaneous mode we consider that m ≤ n. In other words, the number 
of simultaneous users is less than or equal to the number of group members.  
Binary key tree is assumed for key degree in comparison. As stated before, in binary key tree 
the height of tree is log2n which shows the number of nodes in each branch. Obviously, the 
efficiency of a protocol is related to the height of the key tree. In other words, a key tree with 
smaller height is more efficient than a tree with larger height. Consequently, since the tree 
height for all of these protocols is equal, the factors that make differences in decreasing 
overhead are the re-keying procedure and the key distribution technique.  
The re-keying method itself is an effective way to reduce the overhead. Regarding re-keying 
method in LKH, OFT, and OKD, the server has more loads for generating, encrypting, and 
delivering keys to the members. In LKH and OFT, the members do not participate in key 
calculation on each membership changes. While in OKD the members involve key update 
process with the key server but the re-keying overhead problem for new members still remains. 
Conversely in CKCS, the contribution of current members in re-keying process and minimum 
number of key delivery to new members are two decisive factors which make it more effective 
than the other ones. Finally, the previously proposed protocols do not consider the simultaneous 
mode at all. So, the overhead of these approaches is not acceptable for this mode. Assuming 
simultaneous mode for these protocols, the results are shown in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
In addition, we have implemented programs to compare the overhead of these mentioned 
protocols. These programs compare the processing time that each protocol spends for generating 
and encrypting necessary keys after each membership changes based on the number of users. 
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The source code of the programs is based on the script language program, ruby, using OpenSSL 
cryptography library. These programs have been run on a 1.66 GHz Windows 7 processor with 
2 GB of RAM. We have used AES-256-OFB to generate keys for LKH. The key generation 
algorithm for OFT, OKD, and CKCSS is based on AES-256-OFB and SHA-1. Finally, we 
sketch some plots (Figures 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16) for showing numerical comparison. For 
this purpose, we consider that there are 100,000 group members and 1024, 2048, 4096, and 
8192 simultaneous users for join/leave. 
6.1. Computational Overhead 
The computational overhead for these Protocols depend on the number of keys that need to be 
generated and encrypted by the server. Table 1 shows the key generation overhead at 
simultaneous join/leave operation. In LKH, group members do not participate in middle node 
keys calculation in each join/leave operation. In OFT, only a new member at join and the 
remaining members at leave need to update the keys in their paths. In OKD, when a member 
joins the group all the necessary keys should be delivered to him/her by unicast and all the 
remaining members can update their middle node keys by themselves, but at leave some nodes 
are responsible for updating the affected keys. So,in these protocols, the key generation 
overhead islog2nfor a single member andmlognwhen m members join/leave the group 
simultaneously. CKCS has the smallest overhead for key generation comparing with the others. 
Table 1.The comparisons of key generation overhead in simultaneous join/leave operations. 
Protocols Join Leave 
LKH 2logm n  2logm n  
OFT 2logm n  2logm n  
OKD 2logm n  2logm n  
CKCS m+1 1 
 
As mentioned above, the previously proposed protocols do not consider the simultaneous mode. 
According to the results, in LKH, OFT, and OKD when m members join/leave the multicast 
group, the server generates keys to update the key tree (all the keys in the paths of m members 
to the root). If m=1, these amounts are equal to the single mode. 
In CKCS, this overhead is decreased to m at join and to 1 at simultaneous leave operation. 
When m members join the group synchronously, the server generates an individual key for each 
of them (m individual keys for m members) and one group key. Also, when m members leave 
the group, the server generates only a new group key for the remaining members. All the 
necessary keys in CKCS are calculated by the group members.  
Table 2 illustrates the key encryption overhead for m simultaneous join/leave. The results show 
that LKH, OFT and OKD have high overhead at join/leave. But in CKCS, this overhead is the 
lowest one because in each join operation the server encrypts only the new group key with each 
new member’s individual key. In CKCS, the key encryption overhead at leave is equal to the 
height of the key tree because the server encrypts the group key by the top node of each part for 
users who are located at that part. 
Table 2.The comparison of key encryption overhead at simultaneous join/leave operations. 
Protocols Join Leave 
LKH 23 logm n  22 logm n  
OFT 22 logm n  2logm n  
OKD 2logm n  2logm n  
CKCS m 2log n  
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Figures11 and 12 illustrate the computational overhead (processing time versus the number of 
simultaneous users) for simultaneous join/leave. As shown, LKH has the highest gradient when 
m members join/leave the group concurrently. OFT and OKD have the lower computational 
overhead than LKH in simultaneous join/leave. In simultaneous join operation, the 
computational overhead of OFT is higher than OKD but at leave these protocols have almost the 
same overhead. CKCSS has the lowest overhead at both simultaneous membership changes. 
 
 
6.2. Communication Overhead and Message Size 
Table 3 depicts the communication overhead at simultaneous join/leave operation. 
Communication overhead at simultaneous join is divided into two categories, unicast and 
multicast overhead. As shown in this table, LKH and OFT have the same communication 
overhead at join/leave which is the highest one. These two protocols have both unicast and 
multicast communication in each simultaneous join. This happens because necessary keys for 
new members are sent by unicast and for remaining members by multicast. In OKD and CKCS, 
 
Figure 12.  Computational overhead versus number of group members at simultaneous leave 
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Figure 11. Computational overhead versus number of group members at simultaneous join 
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all the keys are collected in one message, and sent to new members by one multicast message. 
So, there is no overhead for unicast but 1 multicast transmission exists when m members join 
the group.Figures13 and 14 illustrate the numerical results for communication overhead at 
simultaneous join/leave respectively. 
Table 3.The communication overhead at simultaneous join/leave operations. 
Protocols  Join   Leave  Unicast Multicast Multicast 
LKH 2logn n  22 logn n  2logn n  
OFT 2logn n  2logn n  2logn n  
OKD 2logn n  - 2logn n  
CKCS - 1 2log n  
 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 13. Communication overhead versus number of group memberssimultaneous join 
(a) unicast communication (b) multicast communication 
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Table 4 shows message size in simultaneous join/leave. For simultaneous join/leave, CKCS has 
the lowest message size in each message transmission. All the other protocols have large 
message size for simultaneous because of their necessary transmissions. In CKCS, the server 
sends one multicast message which includes m keys. Each of these keys contains the group key 
encrypted by the individual key of each simultaneous user.Figures15 and 16 illustrate the 
numerical results for message size at simultaneous join/leave respectively. 
 
Table 4.Message size at simultaneous join/leave operations. 
Protocols Join Leave 
LKH 22 logm n  22 logm n  
OFT 2log 1m n +  2log 1m n +  
OKD 2logm n  2logm n  
CKCS m m 
 
 
Figure 15.  Message size at simultaneous join 
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Figure 14. Communication overhead versus number of group members atsimultaneous leave 
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Figure16. Message size at simultaneous leave 
Although LKH based protocols minimized the overhead of leave operation to log2n, they added 
unnecessary overhead to join operation. This amount gets larger when number of users 
increases. With a glance at Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 it is not difficult to see that CKCSS has two 
major features. First, the overhead of CKCSS at join does not depend on the number of users. It 
means that the overhead for new member is a constant amount while there is no overhead for 
current users. Second, reducing the overhead for new user at single join is the other important 
factor for simultaneous mode. This factor is crucial for simultaneous join.  
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper proposed a new group key management protocol, CKCS, for simultaneous 
join/leave. The protocol is based on logical key hierarchy. In simultaneous mode, when 
members join the multicast group simultaneously, the server creates a new key tree for the 
members and their individual keys. The new key tree is attached to the old one by adding a new 
node to the top of the previous one. When several members leave the group, only the new group 
key is sent to the remaining members.  At the end, we conclude our proposal with some of its 
contributions:  
 CKCS reduces key generation and key encryption overhead largely in simultaneous 
join/leave. 
 CKCS reduces unicast and multicast communication overhead largely at join in 
simultaneous mode.  
 CKCS reduces message size for unicast communication. 
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